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COMMENTS
STANDING TO SUE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS:
CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO REDUCE
JUDICIAL BARRIERS TO JUSTICIABILITY
I.

INTRODUCTION

One of the pnmary concerns of the framers of the ConstitutIOn
was the protection of states nghts agamst oppreSSIOn by a strong
federal government. As the court system was vIewed as CruCIal to
those nghts, one safeguard written mto the Constitution was the
creation of federal courts with junsdictIon much more limited than
the general junsdictIon of the state courts. Federal courts may de
cIde only those types of cases specifically enumerated m the Con
stitutIOn and those cases or controversIes whICh the Congress
shall deem appropnate. 1
Standing to sue, one aspect of federal court junsdictIon, tests
whether a plamtiff will present hIS case with the adverseness re
qUIred by the case or controversy clause of Article III. Standing,
therefore, IS an exammatIon of the partIes, not the merits of the ac
tIon. 2 A plamtiff seekmg to litigate a claIm m federal court must, as
a prelimmary matter satisfy the court that he has standing to liti
gate the claIm. If the plamtiff fails m thIS task, the federal court
will not deCIde the merits of the claIm.
Congress, m the exerCIse of its constitutional power to "limit
and regulate"3 the junsdictIon of the federal courts, has occaSIOn
ally attempted to modify court Imposed reqUIrements of standing. 4
The Supreme Court has upheld these congressIOnal modifications,
withm the narrow confines of the express language of the statutory
standing prOVlSlons. Whether Congress may remove all standing
barners to federal court litigation IS not clear ThIS comment, by
lookmg at the histoncal development of the standing doctnne m
the statutory context, and the federal courts response to that de

u.s. CONST. art. III, § 2.
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
3. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
4. See text accompanymg notes 22-45 and 57-65 mfra.
1.
2.
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velopment, attempts to discern to what extent Congress may and
should modify the JudicIal reqUIrements of standing.
In cases ansmg out of an alleged VIOlatIon of plamtiff's constI
tutIonal nghts, the United States Supreme Court has developed a
number of reqUIrements whICh must be met before a plamtiff IS
Judged to have standing to sue. Generally to pass the standing
barner a plamtiff must allege mJury to himself5 or some personal
stake m the outcome of the litIgatIon. 6 The Court has also recently
demanded that a plamtiff show that the mJury was caused by the
defendant's alleged illegal conduct 7 or that the Court's remedial
powers would effectively redress the plamtiff's claImed mJury 8
These two JudiCIally Imposed reqUIrements of standing have
fluctuated often durmg their evolution. While it IS difficult to draw
hard and fast rules about the Court's position, it IS mstructIve to
observe the trends m definmg standing.
II.
A.

REQUIREMENT OF SHOWING INJURY

The Growth of the InjUry or Personal Stake
Outcome Ltmitatwn tn Constitutional Cases

tn

the

The Supreme Court ongmally took a restnctIve VieW of stand
mg, requmng the federal plamtiff to show that he had suffered ac
tual mJury ThIS reqUIrement precluded, for example, suits by
competitors to enJom legal competitIon. 9 In Tennessee Power Co.
v TVA, 10 a utility company challenged on due process grounds the
5. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). Plamtiff, an envIronmental
group, sued to enJoin construction of resort area m
natural reserve. Because
plamtiff alleged no injury to itself or to any of its members, the Supreme Court
demed standing.
6. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Voters challenged enforcement of an ob
solete voter apportionment statute as VIOlative of due process m that theIr votes were
debased. Plamtiffs articulated
suffiCient stake m the outcome of the litigation to
give them standing to sue m federal court.
7 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
8. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Orgamzation, 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
9. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Owners of pnvate school
challenged on due process grounds an Oregon statute requIrIng children under the
age of 18 to attend public school. Society of Sisters argued that the statute hurt their
bus mess Since parents of theIr students were remOVing students because of the stat
ute, and that the statute Interfered with the parents free chOice III determIlllng the
educational needs of theIr children. The Court ultimately upheld the plamtiff'
standing because it sought to protect its bUSiness agamst arbitrary, unreasonable, un
lawful mterference rather than to enJom enforcement of proper state power. In
dOing so, however, the Court noted that such busmess Interest m potential customers
IS not usually suffiCient to withstand
standing attack.
10. 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
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creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) as an unlawful m
terference with the company s busmess mterests. The Court
denIed the plamtiff standing because damage sustamed by other
WIse lawful competition was msufficient to mvoke the power of the
federal courts. 11 The Court acknowledged that the legIslature had
the power to alter the rule agamst competitor suitS. 12 Since the
legIslature had not done so m thIs case, standing depended on the
eXIstence of a legally protected nght, such as that founded m prop
erty contract or tort nghts. 13
Dunng the 1960's, the Court moved toward a less restnctIve
VIew of standing. Rather than reqUIrmg the plamtiff to show legal
wrong, the Court reqUIred only that the plamtiff show some per
sonal stake m the outcome of the litigation. ThIs rule was first an
nounced m 1962 m Baker v. Carr 14 m whICh Tennessee taxpayers
and voters challenged an anCIent state voter apportIonment statute.
The statute, enacted m 1901, had not been modified smce passage
even though the population of Tennessee had grown substantially
and had been WIdely redistributed. Plamtiffs alleged that thIS
growth and redistribution without concomitant modification of the
apportionment statute denIed them equal protection of the laws by
dilutmg the value of theIr votes.
JenkIns v. McKeithen 15 followed the Baker definition of stand
mg. In JenkIns, a UnIon member challenged a LoUISIana statute
creatmg a committee to mvestIgate possible cnmmal law VIOlatIons
m labor-management relations. The plamtiff had not been mJured
by operatIon of the statute but potentIally could have been subject
to cnmmal prosecutIon under the statute. The Court held that thIS
possible cnmmal prosecutIon met the Baker test of a suffiCIent
stake m the outcome of the litigatIon to ensure the adverseness re
qUIred by the case or controversy clause.
Smce 1973, the Court has retreated from its positIon of le
nIency toward standing, and now looks more toward a shOWIng of
mJury as reqUIred m Tennessee Power Co. Four years after JenkInS
was deCIded, the mother of an illegitImate child challenged on
equal protectIon grounds the application of a state nonsupport stat
ute. 16 Lmda R. S., the plamtiff, alleged that state offiCIals system
11.
12.
13.

[d. at 140.
[d. at 141.
[d. at 137.

14. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
15. 395 U.S. 411 (1969).
16. Lmda R. S. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
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atIcally refused to enforce the statute as to fathers of illegitImate
children. Since the father of her child refused to make support
payments, plamtiff alleged that the nonenforcement of the statute
caused her a severe financIal burden. The Court explamed that al
though the plamtiff had demonstrated mJury she had failed to
show that enforcement of the statute s cnmmal sanctIon would alle
VIate her mJury Injury alone, whICh would not be redressed by
the remedy requested, was msufficient to meet the reqUIrements
of standing to sue.
In 1974, m United States v. Richardson,17 a taxpayer at
tempted to force the Central Intelligence Agency to disclose its ex
penditures. The taxpayer Justified hIs request under the statement
and accounts clause of the ConstitutIon. 18 The Court held that the
personal stake reqUIrement of Baker was the outermost limit of
standing. To sue m federal court, a plamtiff must allege mJury set
tIng hIm apart from the rest of the populatIon. 19 A claim by a citI
zen, for example, that he has been mJured as a result of a tax ex
penditure would be msufficlent, absent some specific constitutIonal
limitatIon, to support standing to sue. 20 If the mJury bemg claimed
IS shared by all other citizens, then the courts regard such a claIm
to be a "generalized gnevance,"21 and, therefore, Impenmssible.
Since 1926, the Court has fluctuated m its definitIon of stand
mg to sue m cases brought under the ConstitutIon. From the re
qUirement of shOWing a "legal wrong" m Tennessee Power Co. to
the mere shOWing of mterest or personal stake m the outcome of
17. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
18. "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but In Consequence of Ap
propnation made by Law' and regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and
Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
19. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
20. Flast
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Taxpayers sought to enJoin the expendi
ture of federal tax funds to finance subjects In religIOUS schools. The Court held that
because the plamtiffs alleged that the expenditures VIOlated specific limitation on
tax expenditures contained In the Constitution (in thiS case the establishment and
free exerCise clause), the plaintiffs as taxpayers had standing to sue. See also
Frothmgham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
21. Schlesmger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974). Indi
Vidual plaintiffs and an assOCiation of present and former members of the military re
serves sued on behalf of taxpayers and citizens allegmg that the military reserve
members of the Congress VIOlated the Incompatibility clause of the Constitution, and
were subject to undue mfluence by the executive branch. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. As
m Richardson, the Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they had
failed to allege concrete mJury setting them apart from the general population. 418
U.S. at 180.
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the controversy of Baker the Court has artICulated a wIde range of
standards. Currently the Court seems to be settling on a standard
that falls somewhat between that of Tennessee Power Co and
Baker In reqmrmg a showmg of mJury the Court retreats from
the personal stake standard of Baker and moves toward Tennessee
Power Co. stoppmg short of enumeratmg the type of mJury that IS
appropnate.
B.

LegIslative Modification of the Injury Reqmrement of Standing

The Supreme Court's stnct reqmrement that the plamtiff show
mJury IS one limitatIon on standing. ArtICle III SectIOn 2 of the
ConstitutIon, however empowers Congress to limit and regulate
the JunsdictIon of the federal courts. Where Congress perceIves
that a socIal goal IS best attamed by allowmg a Wider category of
plamtiffs to sue to enforce the statute, it will mclude m the act a
standing prOVlSlon mitIgatIng the Court's reqmrement. Federal
courts, when deCIding cases ansmg under these statutes, will look
carefully at the words of the statute and the congreSSIOnal mtent to
deCIde whether a partICular plamtiff has standing. To ensure that
the plamtiff IS presentmg a case or controversy overbroad standing
will not be Implied. ThIS statutory analysIs usually results m a
broader definitIon of standing than would be possible absent the
statutory proVISIOn. 22
Statutes purportmg to define standing under theIr prOVlSlons
are of two types: Those grantmg standing to persons aggneved or
adversely affected and those grantmg standing to any person.
1.

Statutes ProVIding Standing to Persons
Aggneved or Adversely Affected
a.

Federal CommumcatlOns Act

The Federal Commumcabons Act (FCA) provIdes that appeals
may be taken to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DIStrICt of Co
lumbia from declSlons and orders of the Federal Commumcahons
CommIssIOn (FCC) "[b]y any other person who IS aggneved or
whose mterests are adversely affected by any order of the CommISSIOn grantmg or denymg any [relicensmg] applicatIon.
"23
22. "[I]n the absence of statute expressly confernng standing, federal plam
tiffs must allege some threatened or actual mJury resulting from the putatively illegal
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Orgamzation, 426 U.S. 26, 41
action.
(1976) (quoting Lmda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973)).
23. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (1976).
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An early declSlon decIded under the FCA IS FCC v. Sanders
Brothers Radio Station. 24 There, the Court m upholding the radio
statIon s standing, noted that Congress had, when it passed the
FCA, mtended to afford competitors a nght of actIon as the only
partIes likely to have sufficIent mterest to challenge FCC orders.
In 1966, the U S. Court of Appeals for the DIstnct of ColumbIa ex
tended the reaSOnIng of Sanders Brothers to uphold FCC licensmg
challenges by the listenmg public. In Office of Commumcation of
the Umted Church of Chnst v. FCC 25 the plamtiff, a radio lis
tener, objected to the relicensmg of a radio statIon. Plamtiff alleged
that programs InvolVIng racIal discnmInatIon and denYIng the op
portunity of responsible reply depnved the listenIng public of the
nght to hear balanced programmIng. NotIng that the purpose of
the statute was protectIon of the public Interest, the court found a
nght of actIon In the plamtiff as a representatIve of that public m
terest.
The Federal CommUnIcatIons Act, as Interpreted by the
courts, has removed all but the barest reqmrement of showmg m
JUry or personal stake m the outcome of the litIgatIon. Anyone
withIn the potentIal listenmg range of a radio statIon may mtervene
to contest a licensmg deCISIon by the FCC.

b.

Admlmstrative Procedure Act

The AdmInIstratIve Procedure Act IS SImilar to the Federal
CommUnIcatIons Act In its standing prOVlSlon. It prOVIdes for suit
by a person who suffers legal wrong or IS adversely affected or ag
gneved by agency actIon. 26 A person seekmg JudiCIal reVIew under
the AdmInIstratIve Procedure Act must show that hIS mJury was m
tended to be prevented by the statute authonzIng the agency
actIon.
Since 1970, a number of plamtiffs have sought standing to
challenge agency actIon under the AdmmistratIve Procedure Act.
In Data Processmg Sermce Orgamzations, Inc. v. Camp 27 an or
ganIzatIon of data proceSSIng vendors challenged a ruling that
banks could sell data proceSSIng servIces to other banks and then
customers. Data Processmg SerVICe OrganIzatIons alleged economIC
24. 309 U.S. 470 (1940). Competing radio stations III nelghbonng town sought
to mtervene III and contest heanng grantmg license to new radio station III
Dubuque, Iowa.
25. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
26. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
27. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
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mJury to its members who had lost contracts made prIor to the rul
mg. The Supreme Court found that competitor mterests were
withm the mterests sought to be protected28 by the Bank ServIce
Corporation Act of 1962.29 Followmg the reasonmg of Sanders
Brothers the Court upheld plamtiff's standing to sue under section
10 of the AdmlmstratIve Procedure Act and the Bank ServIce Cor
poratIons Act.
The protected mterest test stated m Data Processmg was ap
plied m Sierra Club v. Morton 30 m whiCh an environmental orga
mzatIon sued to enJom development of a resort area m a natural
reserve. The Court held that when an orgamzatIon such as Sierra
Club sues as a representative of its members, it must show mJury
specifically to its members mterests,31 not mJury only to the gen
eral public. Since Sierra Club s members had suffered no mJury
to a protected mterest, it had no standing to assert a thIrd party
mterest.
Another envIronmental case, United States v. SCRAP 32 repre
sents the hIgh water mark of standing under the AdmlmstratIve Pro
cedure Act. There, the Court upheld the standing of students chal
lengtng an Interstate Commerce CommIssIon (ICC) ruling refusmg
to suspend a surcharge on railroad freIght shIpments. The students
alleged that the surcharge discouraged the use of recycled goods by
mcreasmg the pnce of those goods to prohibitive levels. ThIs,
SCRAP alleged, threatened the natural resources m the
Washmgton, DC., parks whiCh were used by the plamtiffs for rec
reation. ICC had failed to file an environmental Impact statement
m vIOlation of the National EnvIronmental Policy Act of 1969a3
pnor to IssUlng the ruling. Lookmg at the alleged mJury to the stu
dents, the Court found that although the mJury was remote and at
tenuated, SCRAP had alleged mJury to an mterest of its members
whiCh was arguably sought to be protected by the NatIOnal EnVI
ronmental Policy Act of 1969. So long as the mJury even though a
28. In Data Processmg, the Court referred to the mterests sought to be pro
tected by the statute as the zone of mterests protected by the statute. Although the
zone of mterests language appears m only one or two of the Supreme Court stand
mg decIsIOns made subsequent to Data Processmg, the analYSIS employed III subse
quent statutory standing cases follows the pattern set forth III Data Processmg.
29. 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1976). "No bank service corporation may engage III any
activity other than the performance of bank services for banks. Id.
30. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
31. Id. at 734-41.
32. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1969).
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mere trifle, IS to an mterest arguably protected by the relevant
statute, the plamtiff has standing under the AdmImstratIve Proce
dure Act. 34

2.

Statutes ProVlding Standing to Any Person
a.

Clean Alr Act

Recently a number of envIronmental cases have arIsen m the
lower federal courts under the Clean Au Act. The Clean Au Act
grants standing to enforce emISSIon control standards to any per
son. "35 As with statutes grantmg standing to persons aggneved or
adversely affected, federal courts seek, m cases ansmg under these
broad standing statutes, to determme whether the plamtiffs mter
est IS mtended to be protected by Congress. Because these statutes
potentIally grant nomnterested plamtiffs standing to sue, federal
courts must examme carefully a plamtiff's claIm that he fits withm
the meamng of the statute and the case or controversy clause.
In Metropolitan Washtngton Coalition for Clean Alr v. Dis
tnct of Columbta,36 the U S. Court of Appeals for the DistrIct of
ColumbIa Circuit upheld citIzen suits under the Clean AIr Act.
In that case, plamtiff sued under the citIzen suit prOVIsIOn of the
Act to force closmg of an mcmerator allegedly m vIOlatIon of the
approved clean aIr ImplementatIon plan of the Distnct of Colum
bIa. The court noted that m the face of governmental mactIon, citI
zen suit prOVIsIons relax the usual reqUIrements of standing and al
low any person to sue m the public mterest as a pnvate attorney
general. The broad standing prOVlSlons of the Clean Au Act were
also upheld as they pertamed to a transportatIon control plan m
Fnends of the Earth v. Carey 37
Although the Tenth Circuit has hypothetIcally questIoned the
standing of a New York subway nder challengmg an au pollutIon
ImplementatIon plan m Anzona,38 the deCISIons thus far have not
34. 412 U.S. at 689 n.14, (quoting DaVIS, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35
U. CHI. L. REV 601, 613 (1968».
35. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(a) (West Supp. 1979).
[Alny person may commence Civil action on hiS own behalf-(l) agaInst
any person
who IS alleged to be In vIOlation of (A) an emiSSIOn standard
or limitation under thiS chapter or (B) an order Issued by the AdmInistrator
or State with respect to such standard or limitation.
Id.
36. 511 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
37 535 F.2d 165 (lst Cir. 1976).
38. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 116 (lOth Cir.
1973).
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provIded any Impediment to that type of actIOn. One commenta
tor9 questions the constitutionality of the standing prOVlSlons of
the Clean AIr Act. The writer concludes, however, that the tradi
tIOnal reluctance of federal courts to entertam borderline "cases or
controversies" must Yield to congressIOnal determmatIOn that a tra
ditional showmg of mJury IS mappropnate. 40

b.

False Ciatms Act

The False ClaIms Act4 1 provIdes that any person may bnng
suit m hIS own behalf m the name of the United States to recover
funds fraudulently taken from the United States. By bnngmg suit
under thIs Act, the plamtiff-mformer IS entitled, m the court's dis
cretion, to a reward of a portIOn of the money recovered by the
United States. Because an mformer IS not directly mJured by the
fraud agamst the United States, hIS sole mterest m the suit IS m
the reward he may receIve at the conclUSIOn of the suit.
In 1943, the Supreme Court upheld standing under the False
ClaIms Act m United States ex rei. Marcus v. Hess 42 The Court
noted m its declSlon that mfomer s statutes, whICh proVIde for ac
tion by a person who has no mterest m the controversy other than
that provIded by the statute, have long eXIsted m England and thIs
country 43 Since it IS withm the power of the legIslature to enact
such a statute,44 the Court should not refuse to gtve effect to its
proVIsIOns. 45
The Court has mterpreted the case or controversy clause of

39. Cume, JudiCial Revtew Under Federal Polution Laws, 62 IOWA L. REv
1221 (1977).
40. Id. at 1278.
4l. 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1976). The Infonner Act recodified the False Claims Act
of 1940. Id. § 232. In 1970, the Act was amended to reqUire the plamtiff-mfonner to
notify the U.S. Attorney General of the pending action. Id. § 232(c). The government
has 60 days to respond, and, if it chooses, to take over prosecution of the case m the
name of the United States. Id. An award IS precluded if the suit IS predicated on m
fonnation m the possessIOn of the United States at commencement of the suit. Id.
The mfonner potential reward IS reduced from 50% to 25% of the recovery if suit IS
carned on by the mdivldual, or to 10% of the recovery, if the government prosecutes
the suit. Id. § 232(E)(l) & (2).
42. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
43. Id. at 541, n.4 (quoting Marvm v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905».
44. Id. at 542.
45. Id. at 548. The Fifth Circuit recently upheld standing under the False
Claims Act. United States ex rei. Wemberger v. Equitax, Inc., 557 F.2d 456 (5th Cir.
1977). Infonner plamtiff alleged fraud m defendant' billing the government for ser
vices rendered by defendant m collection of mfonnation on prospective government
employees.ld.
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the ConstitutIon to reqmre that a federal plamtiff ralSlng a constitu
tIonal claIm show that he has sustaIned some personal Injury to
withstand an attack on hIs standing to sue. OccasIOnally the Court
has IntImated that Court-drawn reqUIrements of standing may be
modified by Congress In its constitutIonal power to limit and regu
late the Junsdicbon of the federal courts. Where Congress has
acted, the Supreme Court reqUIres, at most, only a shoWIng of
mInImal Injury to some congressIOnally protected Interest. Under
statutes such as the Clean AIr Act's and the Informer s Acts 47
whICh allow any person to sue to enforce these statutes, the federal
courts appear to dispense entIrely with the JudicIally Imposed re
qUIrement of shoWIng Injury
III.

REQUIREMENT OF SHOWING CAUSATION
OR EFFECTIVENESS OF REMEDY

Growth of the Doctnne of Causation m
Constitutwnal Cases
In 1973, In Lmda R. S v. Richard D 48 the United States
Supreme Court held that In additIon to the reqUIrement that a
federal plaIntiff show Injury the plaIntiff must show that hIS par
tIcular Injury could be effectIvely redressed by the federal court's
actIon. SInce that tune, the Court has expanded thIS causatIon as
pect of standing and used it to preclude federal litIgatIon In a
number of situatIons.
In 1975, varIOUS plaIntiffs sued to nullify an allegedly Invalid
exclusIonary zonIng statute. The Court In Warth v. Seldin 49 ruled
that the plaIntiffs lacked standing to sue because they failed to
demonstrate that theIr Injury had been caused by the allegedly ille
gal actIon of the defendant. In the Court's words:
A.

[I]ndirectness of the mJury does not necessarily depnve the per
son harmed of standing to vmdicate hIS nghts.
But it may
make it substantially more difficult to meet the mmimum re
qUIrement of Art. III: to establish that, m fact, the asserted m
JUry was the consequence of the defendant's actions, or that pro
spective relief will remove the harm. 50
46.
47
48.
49.
SO.

42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(a) (West Supp. 1979).
31 U.S.C. § 232 (1976).
410 U.S. 614 (1973).
422 U.S. 490 (1975).
Id. at S05.
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In Stmon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Orgamzation,51 mdi
gents sued the Secretary of the Treasury and the CommIssIOner of
Internal Revenue. They challenged a Treasury ruling that de
creased the servIces whICh nonprofit hospitals were reqUIred to
gIve to mdigents. The Court reaffirmed Warth, and held that the
plamtiffs lacked standing because they had failed to show that the
defendants had caused theIr mJury
In 1978, an envIronmental group sued the mvestor-owned
public utility engaged m constructmg a nuclear power plant,
seekmg a declaratIOn that the liability limitatIons of the Pnce
Anderson AtomIC Energy Act52 vIolated due process and equal pro
tectIon. The Court m Duke Power Company v. Caroline Envtron
mental Study G roup 53 found that plamtiffs had alleged suffiCient
mJury m the envIronmental Impact of the proposed nuclear plant
to meet the first half of the standing test set forth m Warth and St
mon. 54 On the questIon of causatIon, the Court noted that a plam
tiff could satIsfy the causatIon element of standing by either show
mg, as m Warth and Stmon, that hIS mJury could be traced to the
challenged actIon of the defendant, or by shOWing, as m Ltnda R.
S that exerCIse of the Court's powers would effectIvely redress hIS
claImed mJury The distnct court had found a "but for" causal con
nectIon between the Pnce-Anderson Act and the nuclear plant con
structIon. Because thIS finding of a causal connectIon was not
clearly erroneous, the Court held it suffiCIent to satIsfy the causa
tIon reqUIrement.
51. 426 U.S. 26 (1976). In Simon, the Court applied the "injUry m fact caused
by the defendant" analYSIS to the standing question, even though plamtiffs sought
standing under ~ 10 of the Admmlstrative Procedure Act (APA). 5 U.S.c. ~ 702
(1976). 426 U.S. at 41. Standing under the APA would ordinarily subject plamtiffs to
the lesser protected mterest" showmg reqUIred m cases ansmg under statutory defi
nitions of standing. The Court m Simon did not recogmze plamtiffs as persons ag
gneved or adversely affected under the proVISIOns of statute governmg the actions
of the Internal Revenue ServIce. Id. The Court quoted from Lmda R. S., at least m
the absence of statute expressly confernng standing, federal plamtiffs must allege
some threatened or actual mJury resulting from the putatively illegal actions before
federal court may assume Junsdiction. Id. (quoting Lmda R. S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614, 617 (1973)). The Court applied standing analYSIS used m cases ansmg un
der the Constitution. Under the causation articulated m Warth, plamtiffs m Simon
failed to show either that defendants actions caused the alleged mJury or that the re
quested relief would effectively redress plamtiffs mJury, therefore, plamtiffs lacked
standing to sue. 426 U.S. at 44-45.
52. 42 U.S.C. ~ 2210 (1976).
53. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
54. Id. at 72.

82

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:71

Before 1976, the Court reqUIred that the plamtiff show either
a personal stake m the outcome of the litIgatIOn55 or mJury m
fact. 56 Warth and S,mon added a causatIon aspect to the JudicIally
Imposed mJury reqUIrement of standing. The Duke Power case em
phasIzed that the causatIon reqUIrement could be satIsfied by eI
ther a shoWing that plamtiff's mJury was traceable to defendant's
actIon or that the mJury would be redressed by the remedy sought.

Dealing with Causation or Effectweness of
Remedy Through LegIslation
The causatIon reqUIrement, artIculated m Ltnda R. S Warth,
Simon and Duke Power does not present a barner to standing to
sue m cases ansmg under statutory grants of standing. In
artICulating the reqUIrement of standing, the Warth Court held
that while federal courts could only act where the plamtiff's mJury
could be traced to the alleged illegal conduct of the defendant, 57
thIS causatIon requrrement could be modified by Congress. 58
One of the petitIoners m Warth, Metro Act, a public Interest
group concerned with ralSlng conSCIOusness toward problems of
discnmmation m housmg, represented a group of resIdents of
Penfield, New York. These members alleged mJury from Penfield's
exclusIOnary zonmg poliCIes because they were bemg demed the
benefits of livmg m a racIally and ethmcally mtegrated community
The Supreme Court recogmzed that for an assocIatIon to have
standing to sue as a representatIve of its members, it must assert a
distmct mJury to itself or to one or more of its members. 59 While
admittmg that the demal of the benefits of livmg m an mtegrated
community mIght constitute suffiCIent mJury for standing under the
FaIr Housmg Act60 as mterpreted m Trafficante v. Metropolitan
B.

55. Schlesmger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Lmda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S.
614 (1973).
56. Schlesmger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974);
Lmda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973); Jenkms v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411
(1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Tileston
Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
57. 422 U.S. at 499.
58. Id. at 500.
59. Id. at 511.
60. The Fair Housmg Act IS typical of the statutes granting standing to person
aggneved or adversely affected under its provIsIOns. The Fair Housmg Act provides
that on failure of admmlstrative remedy, any person aggneved by discnmmatory
housmg practice may commence suit m
United States distrIct court. 42 U.S.C. §
3610 (1976).
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Life Insurance Co. 61 the Court m Warth held that thIs mJury
would not suffice when allegmg a constitutIonal vIOlatIon. 62
In Trafficante one black and one white tenant of an apart
ment building sued theIr landlord, allegmg mJUry m bemg demed
the advantages of livmg m an mtegrated neIghborhood. Although
neither plamtiff had been discnmmated agamst by the landlord,
the Court held that plamtiffs had alleged sufficIent mJury to bnng
them withm the scope and mtent of the Act. JustIce White, m hIs
concurnng opmIOn, satd that absent the Civil Rights Act of 1968,
he would be unable to conclude that petitIoners complamt pre
sented a case or controversy 63 Thus, the Court IS willing to gIve
effect to express statutory language definmg standing to sue under
the Act's prOVISIOns.
A recent declSlon of the Court extends Trafficante to the situ
atIon presented m Warth. In Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood,64 reSIdents of Bellwood, IllinOIS, and the town itself
sued two real estate agenCieS m the town for steermg white clients
toward white areas of the town, and black clients toward mtegrated
areas of the town. RacIal steenng of thIS type created raCIal
Imbalance m Bellwood's housmg situatIon, and depnved the mdi
VIdual plamtiffs of the benefits of livmg m an mtegrated commu
nity The platntiffs brought suit under sectIon 812 of the FaIr
Housmg Act, argumg that the person aggneved or adversely af
fected language of sectIon 810 should be read mto sectIon 812,
whICh IS silent on the questIon of who has standing to sue under its
provlSlons. The Court found the plamtiffs argument persuaSIve m
light of the legIslatIve hIstory of the FaIr Housmg Act. 65
No language m Trafficante or Gladstone refers to the causa
tIon element where standing IS claImed under the language of a
statute. The ImplicatIon from the results m these cases and Warth
IS that where Congress clearly mtends to prOVIde standing to a
class of plamtiffs, that mtent will not be thwarted by JudiCIally
Imposed rules govermng standing. Language m Warth taken m
connectIon with the declSlons m Trafficante and Gladstone mdi
cates that the Warth plamtiffs would have had standing to sue un
der the FaIr Housmg Act. The error committed by the Warth
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

409 U.S. 205 (1972). See text accompanymg note 63 mfra.
Id. at 514.
ld. at 212.
99 S. Ct. 1601 (1979).
ld. at 1609-13.
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plamtiffs was m relymg solely on constitutIonal clalms. The Judi
clally lmposed causation aspect of standing to sue lS allevlated by
statute even though there IS no specific language m the statute
dealing with the causatIon aspect. CongressIOnal mtent to define
the level of mJury necessary to allow suit IS sufficlent also to re
move the reqmrement of shoWlng that plamtiff's mJury was caus
ally related to the defendant's illegal actIon, or that exerClse of the
court's remedial power would effectIvely redress pi am tiff' s mJury
IV

CONCLUSION

Standing to sue, as a rule of JustIclability grew out of the case
or controversy clause of the ConstitutIon. To constitute a case or
controversy lssues before the federal court must be couched with
specificity and adverseness. 66 When a defendant questIons a plam
tiff's standing to sue, he raises doubt about the plamtiff's ability to
present adequately a concrete, adverse positIon before the court.
Ongmally to have standing, a plamtiff had to aver some mJury
to a legally protected mterest. 67 ThlS reqmrement of legal mJury
was softened somewhat durmg the slXtIes by a number of Supreme
Court declSlons whIch held that a personal stake m the outcome of
the litIgatIon was sufficlent to supply the adverseness demanded by
the case or controversy clause. 68 Thls personal stake standard for
standing to sue was hailed as a new day m federal litIgatIon,
removmg all but the least mtruslve of barners to standing to sue. 69
Recent declsIOns m cases ansmg under the ConstitutIon, how
ever, have erected a number of new standing barners to suit m the
federal courts. The personal stake reqUlrement artIculated m the
Baker case has been supplanted by a stnct reqUlrement of shoWlng
actual mJUry to the plaIntiff.70 In additIon, a reqmrement that the
plamtiff show that hls partlCulanzed, actual mJury be causally re
lated to the defendant's putatIvely illegal act, or that hls mJury be
redressed by the court's remedial actIon has been thrust upon the
federal plamtiff. 71 A showmg of causatIon goes beyond the mitIal
mqUlry of JustIciability mto the fitness and ability of plamtiff to
carry on a suit as an adverse party to defendant. To reqUlre a
66. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968).
67. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1938).
68. See text accompanymg notes 14 & 15 supra.
69. Monaghan, Constitutional AdjudicatIOn: The Who and When, 82
1363 (1973).
70. See text accompanymg notes 16-21 supra.
71. See text accompanymg notes 48-54 supra.
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plamtiff to show causatIon IS to reqUIre him to prove his case be
fore entenng the courtroom. If, as the Court itself has srud, stand
mg speaks to the nature of the parties to a case and not to the mer
its of the action, the causation element of standing cannot be
Justified, and should be elimmated. 72
Congress, under Article III of the Constitution, has the power
to limit and regulate the JunsdictIon of the federal courts. Some
legislatIOn IS most easily effectuated by suit by a broad category of
plamtiffs. It IS not practical, for exrunple, for Congress to set up
watch dog committees to monitor every possible abuse of environ
mental standards throughout the country Much environmental
litigation occurs because concerned citizens notify the federal
regulatory agencies of abuses takmg place. To facilitate the Imple
m;nlatIOn of its poliCies, Congress provides for a broader than nor
malcategory of plamtiffs to sue to enforce the statute.
While the Court has severely limited federal litigatIOn ansmg
under the Constitution, it seems amenable to broad definition of
classes of federal plallltiffs havmg standing to sue under federal
statutes. 73 The mJury and causation reqUIrements defined by the
Court all but disappear where congressIOnal mtent to broaden the
allowable category of plruntiffs IS clear The extent to whICh Con
gress can exercise that power IS unclear It IS clear that Congress
may pass statutes like the Informer s Acts whICh prOVIde the only
mterest a plamtiff has m the litIgatIon. 74 It IS also clear that Con
gress need not specially deal with the causation element of stand
mg to sue so long as the mtent to mclude a broad category of
plamtiffs IS clear 75
One commentator76 has suggested that Congress could pass a
statute providing that any citizen or reSident of the United States
has an lllterest m the frur mterpretatIon and admlll1stratIon of the
laws and Constitution of the United States, and that any potential
VIOlation of those statutes or Constitution creates lllJUry III the citi
zen or reSident. Any citizen or reSident, therefore, has lllJUry suffi
72. As stated by Mr. Justice Brennan In hIS dissent In Warth to reqUIre plaIn
tiffs to show causation IS "to reqUIre them to prove theIr case on paper In order to
get Into court at all, reverting to the form of fact pleading long abjured In the federal
courts. 422 U.S. at 528.
73. See, e.g., Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 99 S. Ct. 1601 (1979);
United States v. SCRAP 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
74. See text accompanymg notes 41-45 supra.
75. See text accompanyIng notes 57-65 supra.
76. Sedler, Standing and the Burger Court: An AnaLYSIS and Some Proposals
for LegIslative Reform, 30 RUTGERS L. REv 863 (1977).
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clent to have standing to sue to challenge the mterpretatlOn or ad
mmistratIon of the laws and the Constitution of the United States.
Whether thIs type of all purpose standing statute would withstand
a constitutional challenge IS not clear Statutes with a sImilar effect
m narrow areas of the law such as the Clean Au Act and the In
former s Acts have been upheld, but these statutes have not been
tested to the full boundanes of theIr language. Furthermore, it
may not be prudent to open up the federal courts to suits by par
ties who are less than actively mterested m the outcome of the liti
gation. Certamly to the extent that a nomnterested or nonadverse
party attempts to mvoke the Junsdiction of the federal courts, he
may be barred by other aspects of JusticIability such as collusIve
ness or npeness. These limitations, however, do not completely
supplant the standing aspect of federal court JunsdictlOn, and may
therefore, not adequately limit the Junsdiction of the federal
courts.
Perhaps rather than provIde for umversal standing to all per
sons m all areas of federal litigation, it would better serve the pur
poses of Congress and the public to broaden the ability of public
mterest groups to sue to enforce the prOVlSlons of federal statutes.
Public mterest groups like Sierra Club, while not mJured by a par
ticular envuonmental law mfraction, represent a category of plam
tiffs who will adequately and vIgorously represent the Views of par
ties who are m fact mJured by the illegal action. There IS no harm
m allowmg these groups to act as pnvate attorneys general to rep
resent the mterests of mJured partieS m theu area of expertise.
The Court has often differentiated between constitutional limI
tations on standing and "prudential rules" of standing governmg ac
tlOns brought by partIes seekmg to assert the nghts or legal mter
ests of others to obtam relief for mJury to themselves. 77 Rather
than passmg statutes broadenmg the definition of mJury whICh has
been labelled a constitutional limitation of standing, and nskmg m
validation as exceeding the case or controversy clause, the Con
gress should concentrate on reducmg the Court Imposed prudential
rules of standing. Furthennore, the Congress mIght urge a return
to the Baker standard, whICh reqmred the plamtiff to show a per
sonal stake m the outcome, m dealing with suits arlSlng under
United States statutes. ThIS approach would assure the mtegrity of
the case or controversy clause while producmg a broad effectuation
of congresslOnal mtent.
Anne M Cohen
77. 422 U.S. at 509.

